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The present paper points out that there are tasks that 
primary groups perform better than bureaucracies and 
those that bureaucracies perform better than primary 
groups. Both types of tasks are very interdependent so 
that sometimes primary group tasks must be per- 
formed within the boundaries of the bureaucratic 
organization. The argument is made that when primary 
groups intervene in bureaucracies, they can do so 
directly in non-expert tasks without lowering the effec- 
tiveness of the bureaucratic organization. When they 
intervene in expert aspects, they should do so indirectly 
through an expert advocate. However, in all inter- 
vention the primary group must take into account that 
its structure is contradictory to that of the bureaucracy 
and, therefore, it must keep as much distance as 
possible----consistent with its ability to intervene. From 
this analysis we derive a series of hypotheses suggest- 
ing when the community might ideally use the 
bureaucracy's own experts, when the community must 
hire its own experts, when the community should 
use mass media, strikes, indigenous workers, etc. It is 
suggested that the multitudinous possibilities for 
linkages can all be derived from a few basic underlying 
dimensions of the situation. 
Cet article montre qu'il existe certaines tfiches que les 
groupes primaires accomplissent mieux que les 
bureaucraties, et certaines autres qu'accomplissent 
mieux les bureaucraties. Les deux sortes de tftches sont 
interd6pendentes; donc parfois les fftches des groupes 
primaires doivent s'accomplir parmi les organisations 
bureaucratiques. Les auteurs soutiennent que les 
groupes primaires peuvent intervenir dans les bureau- 
craties en compl&ant les t~ches non-expertes sans 
r6duire l'efficacit6 de l'organisation bureaucratique. 
Quands ils participent ~ certains sujets experts, ils 
devraient se munir d'un agent expert. Mais dans route 
intervention le groupe primaire doit se rendre compte 
que sa structure contredit celle de la bureaucratie et 
que, par cons&tuent, il doit se tenir autant ~ distance 
que possible par rapport ~ sa comp6tence d'interven- 
tion. De eette analyse proviennent des hypotheses qui 
indiquent quand une communaut6 peut se servir le 
mieux du personnel expert d'une bureaucratic, quand 
la communaut6 doit engager des experts, quand la 
communaut6 dolt se servir des mass m6dia, des 
gr~ves, des ouvriers indig~nes, etc. Les nombreuses 
possibilit6s de liaisons proviennent toutes de quelques 
dimensions fondamentales de la situation. 
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Recently there has been a great deal of controversy over 
the question of community participation in large-scale 
organizations. Much of this controversy has centered 
around organizations such as the school, police, and 
welfare departments. In the present paper we examine 
the theoretical basis for community participation in 
these organizations and suggest some optimal linkages 
that would take into account the contradictory struc- 
tures and the complementary goals of the bureaucracy 
and of the primary group (i.e., any small face-to-face 
group that stresses positive affect, non-instrumental 
permanent and diffuse relations, such as a family or 
friend). 
First we review the alternative theories on the re- 
lationship between primary groups and bureaucratic 
organizations, then discuss some of the variables that 
affect the linkage mechanisms selected by the primary 
group. Some generic social situations are discussed in 
order to illustrate the application of our framework. 
The present paper can be considered an extension 
and elaboration of the article, "A Balance Theory of 
Coordination between Bureaucratic Organizations and 
Community Primary Groups" (Litwak & Meyer, 1966), 
which concentrated on the opposite problem, that is, 
how bureaucratic organizations optimally intervene to 
change community primary groups. 
Two Currently Held Views 
Traditional Point oJ View--  
The Power of the Bureaucracy 
The traditional position on the role of bureaucratic 
organizations and community primary groups has been 
one that states that bureaucratic organizations will take 
over most of the functions of the primary group because 
they are more efficient. Furthermore, because the pri- 
mary group and bureaucratic organizations have con- 
tradictory structures, they cannot both exist in very 
strong forms in the same society. Thus the stronger one 
becomes, the weaker the other becomes. This kind of 
reasoning has prompted many past writers to speak 
about the change from a folk to an urban mass society 
dominated by large organizations (Ogburn, 1953; 
Red_field, 1947; Simmel, 1950; T~Snnies, 1940, esp. 
pp.18-28; Weber, 1952; Wirth, 1957). 
Underlying their analyses as to why the bureau- 
cratic organization is more effective than the primary 
group is generally the theory that the bureaucratic or- 
ganization can concentrate more knowledge and re- 
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sources on solving any given problem than the primary 
group can. Thus the bureaucratic organization insures 
optimal knowledge because it appoints and promotes 
people in terms of their ability to handle the designated 
tasks. By contrast the primary group member is born 
(or marries) into the group and is considered a mem- 
ber regardless of his ability to accomplish tasks. 
The bureaucracy not only maximizes knowledge 
by its selection procedures, but it permits on-the-job 
training by its use of specialization. By contrast a family 
consists of a small number of people with many differ- 
ent, legitimate tasks. There is a division of labor within 
the family but there cannot be the degree of specializa- 
tion that takes place in the work situation. In addition, 
the bureaucracy, because of its size, can support large- 
scale machinery that leads to effective production, e.g., 
a factory can have an assembly line, blast furnace, huge 
drill presses, etc. 
The bureaucracy not only has a greater concentra- 
tion of knowledge, but it must insure the fight knowl- 
edge is in the right place at the right time. Thus the 
bureaucracies stress rules to insure that each specialized 
segment of the organization is doing things that are 
consistent with its other segments. In those situations 
where rules cannot be drawn up, then the bureaucracy 
has hierarchal authority to insure that once a decision 
is made it will be the same for the entire enterprise. By 
contrast the family, as a small unit, gains coordination 
through face-to-face contact. 
The bureaucracy further guards against the intru- 
sion of extraneous values or interpersonal likes and 
dislikes by insisting on a priori delimitation of duties 
and privileges and impersonal relations. By contrast 
primary group members are on call night and day. 
Furthermore, primary groups place a great value on 
positive affection and as a matter of principle insist 
that personal feelings come before all else. 
Finally the bureaucracy permits change by separat- 
ing policy from administrative decisions. Thus one can 
change policies without having to fire the entire organi- 
zation and starting anew. By contrast primary groups 
usually have, as one of their chief goals, the internali- 
zation of cultural values. To change family policy (e.g., 
religious beliefs, political beliefs, socialization norms, 
social manners, etc.) requires a major resocialization 
process. 
What should be clear is that bureaucracies can op- 
timize knowledge by stressing aspects of group struc- 
ture that are contradictory to that of the primary group. 
This is the basis for the traditional view that bureau- 
cracies are most effective and that societies cannot tol- 
erate strong forms of both bureaucracies and primary 
groups. 
With this traditional framework there is only one 
way primary groups can intervene in the bureaucracy, 
and that is through appointing people to the top policy 
boards and working through them. 1 
A Contemporary Point of View 
There is a second point of view, which is currently 
held by many sociologists. They accept much of the 
first analysis, but they raise a very important excep- 
tion. They suggest that there are tasks for which econo- 
mies of large-scale and expert knowledge are not 
advantageous. They point out that such activities as 
early socialization of the child and adult tension man- 
agement are tasks that are necessary for social survival 
and that the bureaucratic organizations cannot handle 
because they require positive affect. (Parsons & Bales, 
1955) 
Given the need for tension management and early 
socialization of the child and given the fact that bureau- 
cratic organizations have contradictory structures to 
the primary groups, these authors conclude that 
bureaucratic organizations and primary groups must 
be kept relatively isolated from each other. If they 
become too close they will tend to destroy each other. 
As a consequence, this point of view would suggest 
that primary groups and bureaucratic organizations 
retain an alliance at arms distance. Thus, schools with 
1 However, they are unh~ely to be effective because community 
primary groups are likely to wane in influence where bureaucracies 
are strong. This analysis provides the theoretical underpinning for 
the kind of pessimism generated by people such as Marcuse (1966). 
It is clear that ff any unscrupulous group seized control of these 
bureaucracies (as is suggested as being inevitable by such people 
as Miehels (1952), Marcuse (1966), and C. Wright Mills) the bu- 
reaucracies would become a power unto themselves. Primary groups 
just do not have the organizational bases to compete with bureau- 
cratic organizations and ff they should somehow successfully inter- 
vene at any but the most general policy level they will destroy the 
bureaucracy. Put somewhat differently, this point of view suggests 
that parents can at best seek to control the board of education so 
as to set general educational policy but efforts on their part to deal 
with the everyday running of schools or the details of curriculum 
will either fail or, insofar as they succeed, destroy the educational 
system, i.e., replace expertise with nepotism. The same point can 
be made with regard to the police. The intuitive acceptance of this 
analysis is behind the "nihilism" of some student radical move- 
ments that suggest that we must reject technological priorities, 
bring the system down, and start afresh. 
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children who are disciphne problems or have emotional 
problems will inform parents and expect them to handle 
the matter. On the other hand, if the parent feels that 
the school is not performing its job effectively (e.g., a 
teacher is drunk in class) then the parent is supposed 
to protest via the regular bureaucratic channels pro- 
vided for such occasions (i.e., letter to the principal or 
superintendent of schools). The actual correction of 
wrongdoing must be left to the bureaucracy. 
To summarize, the clear implication of this ap- 
proach is that bureaucratic organizations and com- 
munity primary groups each have their own spheres 
and neither intervenes in the other. The most each 
does is to draw the attention of the other to the pre- 
sumed defects. However, the ultimate judgment and 
treatment of these presumed defects are left in the 
hands of the respective groups. 
The Balance Theory 
There is yet another point of view that we develop in 
this paper. It is called the balance theory of coordina- 
tion (Litwak & Meyer, 1966). 
This point of view agrees with the first premise of 
both prior positions. The bureaucratic organizations 
provide the optimal organizational bases for the ex- 
ercise of power insofar as concentration of speciahzed 
knowledge and economies of large scale are important. 
This viewpoint furthermore accepts the premise that 
the structures of the bureaucratic organizations and 
community primary groups tend to be antithetical. In 
the same way as the second position, the third rejects the 
assumption that economies of large scale and special- 
ized knowledge are invariably important ingredients 
for solving problems. However, this position differs in 
two very important respects from the second one. First, 
it suggests that primary groups may exercise power in 
most areas of hfe (i.e., not just those of tension man- 
agement and early socialization). Second, it suggests 
that the great interdependence in tasks between pri- 
mary groups and bureaucratic organizations means that 
they can not be kept isolated from each other without 
causing damage to the achievement of their respective 
goals. As a consequence, the balance theory predicts 
that the community and the bureaucracy will optimally 
achieve their respective goals if they operate at some 
mid-point in distance from each other. If they are too 
close their contradictory structures will cause friction. 
If they are too far they will not have the optimum in 
organizational resources. Since most persons under- 
stand the role of bureaucracy and trained knowledge, 
we indicate first the general bases for primary group 
power, i.e., when trained knowledge is not important. 
The Bases Jor Primary Group Powerm 
Non-Expert Tasks 
Perhaps one of the most obvious situations where 
trained experts are of httle use is where there is no real 
knowledge. Thus, there are many frontier areas where 
we have no specialized knowledge. The treatment of 
alcohohsm, overeating, and drug addiction are but 
three areas where the current state of knowledge is not 
sufficiently great to justify highly specialized training 
or specialized machinery for immediate treatment. 2 
The proof is that in these situations, volunteers with 
relatively modest training seem to be doing as well as 
highly trained specialists. Another area where special- 
ized knowledge and resources make httle difference is 
where the task is so simple to perform that the ordinary 
citizen has enough knowledge to perform it as well or 
almost as well as the speciahst. Thus, the ordinary 
mother through the ordinary sociahzation process is 
almost as good as the expert (i.e., child specialist) in 
watching a child so that he does not go into the street, 
and if he does go into the street she is usually as 
capable as most experts in pulling him out of the way 
of an oncoming car. 
Finally, there are times where the complexity of the 
situation, its unpredictability, and the need for great 
speed, make it difficult, if not impossible, to bring 
experts or large-scale machinery into play in time to 
do any good. For instance, in our illustration of a 
mother pulling a child out of the way of an oncoming 
car, it is not only the simphcity of the act that is at 
issue, but the inability to anticipate the crisis. Even if 
an expert were a little better trained, the probability of 
an expert (doctor) being at the proper place as com- 
pared to a primary group member (mother) is very 
low 3 and speed is more important than expertise. Some- 
times the unpredictability of the event is based on the 
number of contingencies rather than the inability to 
anticipate it (e.g., everyday childrearing decision). 
2 What we are saying is that for short-term treatment the expert 
is not the most effective. We might still want experts in the field 
because they might be better in the long run. 
a One of the characteristics of primary group relations is face-to- 
face contact in many areas of life and, all other things being equal, 
this means that primary group members are more  often next to 
each other than are persons involved in secondary social relations. 
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To summarize, there are at least three instances 
where there are no advantages from specially trained 
experts or from economies of large scale: (1) where 
there is not sufficient knowledge to make training or 
designing machinery worthwhile, (2) where the tasks 
to be done are sufficiently simple so that the ordinary 
citizen with ordinary resources can do them as well as 
trained experts with large resources, and (3) where 
the complexity and the unexpectedness of the situation 
prevent the special knowledge of experts or the ad- 
vantages of large-scale machinery from being used. We 
refer to all such tasks where experts have no real 
advantage over non-experts as non-expert tasks. What 
is important to stress is that these tasks constitute a 
major part of a person's life and cover every area of 
life (e.g., inside and outside of organizations). 
Primary Groups and Speed and Flexibility 
To point out that there are many tasks for which 
bureaucracies are not more effective than primary 
groups is only one part of our analysis. We submit that 
the primary group is not only equal to the bureau- 
cracy but is a more power[ul base for handling non- 
expert tasks. Our argument is that the very structure 
of the primary group, which makes it inefficient for 
developing trained expertise and large resources, makes 
it a speedier and more flexible decision-making unit 
for non-expert tasks. First, the primary group does not 
appoint persons on merit. However, that is no defect 
if expert knowledge is not a key factor in making a good 
decision (i.e., everybody has sufficient knowledge). 
Given this fact, there is a savings entailed by rejecting 
merit. One can drop the costly procedures that selec- 
tion and promotion on merit entail. Second, the pri- 
mary group does not stress detailed specialization. This 
factor is an advantage, since premature specialization 
or a specialist who does no better than the ordinary 
individual is a resource drain on the organization, 
slows down communication, and leads to inflexibility 
in decision-making (see, e.g., Vinter, 1967; Wilensky 
& Lebeaux, 1958). 
The fact that the primary group is a small face- 
to-face group means that there is almost instantaneous 
feedback, a factor that becomes very important when 
dealing with unexpected and complex events. The 
bureaucracy can compensate for its long chain of com- 
mand and use of rules where it can take advantage of its 
superior knowledge base or superior resources. How- 
ever, when dealing with tasks where knowledge and 
resources provide no real advantage, the bureaucratic 
long lines of communication and rules produce inflexi- 
ble and slower decision-making. 
The positive emotional effect of the primary group 
and its stress on permanent relationships are virtues 
when non-expert tasks are at issue. In situations of 
uncertainty, there is often great anxiety (Blau, 1955). 
In such situations, decisions are much more likely to be 
implemented and communication is more likely to 
occur where members have trust in each other as well 
as long-standing relationships that permit them to un- 
derstand each other's idiosyncrasies. Permitting posi- 
tive affect is therefore functional where there are no 
dangers that emotional states will lead to appointment 
of the wrong person. Since this is the case for non- 
expert tasks and since primary groups permit positive 
affect and bureaucracies do not, we suggest that the 
primary group structure is more effective. 
The reader should be quite clear what is being said 
at this point. The claim is made that primary groups 
are most effective for handling non-expert tasks and 
bureaucracies are most effective for handling expert 
tasks. 
The balance theory, however, argues that most 
areas of life have tasks where there is no real expert 
knowledge; where the situation is too unexpected or 
too complex to bring to bear expert knowledge quickly 
enough; or where the ordinary citizen with ordinary 
socialization and resources can do as well as the trained 
expert. 
Furthermore, there is evidence (Litwak & Figueira, 
1968) for arguing that future technology will always 
insure this situation because technology is as likely to 
produce small-scale as large-scale economies; because 
it opens up new areas of ignorance even as it closes 
down old; and because it simplifies tasks so the ordi- 
nary citizen can take over for the experts even as it 
complicates other tasks so that only trained experts 
can handle them. 
The Interdependence o] Primary Group and 
Bureaucratic Tasks 
We have thus far tried to establish two components of 
the balance theory. We have pointed out that bureau- 
cratic organizations and primary groups are able re- 
spectively to handle different tasks more effectively. 
We have also suggested that they are able to do so 
because they have different, in fact contradictory, 
structures. 4 What we now want to establish is that these 
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two types of tasks are often intertwined so that bureau- 
cracies and primary groups must work in close 
coordination. There is a certain face validity to this 
statement. For instance, it is clear that a doctor is helped 
enormously in his task of keeping people healthy if his 
clients do such non-expert tasks as maintaining good 
diets, taking proper exercise, etc. Teachers have a much 
easier time teaching if the child comes to school with 
an interest in education, properly fed and clothed. In 
all instances it is equally clear that primary groups can 
achieve their goals of health, education, etc., by use 
of experts. The exact degree of interdependence of 
community primary groups and bureaucracies can be 
measured by asking ourselves to what extent do expert 
and non-expert tasks require the same person, the 
same time, and the same place. For instance in the 
school situation, one can think of at least a three-point 
scale. Toward the independent pole of the scale would 
be the non-expert tasks that can be performed within 
the confines of the family and the expert tasks that can 
be performed within the confines of the school. Such 
tasks involve different people, different places, and 
frequently different times. For instance, the family 
supervision of homework and the development of early 
language skills have a very important consequence for 
the type of teaching materials and the speed with which 
the teacher can transmit information in the classroom. 
These two activities are separated by place, by type of 
persons involved, and by time. 
At the other extreme, we have the case where the 
expert tasks are so interdependent with non-expert 
tasks that they cannot be separated in place, time, or 
even people. For instance, it is difficult to separate 
classroom discipline and value socialization from the 
transmission of educational knowledge (e.g., math, 
geography). The first kind of task has more degrees 
of non-expertise than the second kind. Both types of 
tasks have to take place at the same time and same 
place and often the same person has to handle both. 
In between these two extremes we have tasks that 
4 There are some persons who, in their enthusiasm for participant 
democracy, assume the Marxian utopia has arrived (i.e., that  any- 
body can substitute for anybody else and therefore everybody should 
have equal participation in all mat ters) .  Wha t  they are in effect 
doing is denying the role of experts. This kind of thinking leads one 
to patently false conclusions (e.g., saying that passengers should 
participate equally with airplane pilots in all decisions on landing 
airplanes, that  patients should participate equally with doctors on 
where an incision should be made, etc.).  
can be separated by people and frequently by time or 
by place. Thus, the Board of Education makes educa- 
tional policy (generally involving non-expert tasks) 
that is implemented by the staff and that involves ex- 
pert tasks. There is some separation in place and by 
people in that the Board generally meets in a central 
building that is physically isolated from the bulk of 
the school staff and has contact with only a limited 
number of staff members, e.g., the superintendent of 
schools. Street guards and luncheon attendants, who 
are indigenous to the neighborhood, are also perform- 
ing basically nonuniform tasks and are separated from 
the professional staff by time and place. 
We have now sought to establish the following 
points. The bureaucracies are best able to handle ex- 
pert tasks, the primary groups are best able to handle 
non-expert tasks, the structures of the two organiza- 
tions are contradictory, and the tasks are interdepen- 
dent (i.e., to achieve most goals one needs to deal with 
both expert and non-expert tasks). 
These points set the basis for the "balance theory 
of coordination" as well as suggesting the theoretical 
bases for community intervention. The balance theory 
suggests two kinds of dangers. First, the fact that the 
community and the bureaucracy are not sufficiently 
linked to coordinate their activities means that the 
overall goal achievement of both organizations suffers 
because either the non-expert or the expert parts of 
the goals are not carried out. The second kind of 
danger emerges where the primary group members and 
the bureaucrats are brought into intimate everyday 
contact. Because of their conflicts in structures and 
norms, this contact could lead to serious friction be- 
tween them. Alternatively it could lead to the introduc- 
tion of contractual bureaucratic norms into the primary 
groups or the nepotistic, familistic norms into the 
bureaucracy. Any one of these alternatives would mean 
that the expert or non-expert aspects or tasks would 
not be done. 5 
Given the above analysis of danger from too close 
or not enough contact between organizations, the bal- 
ance theory hypothesizes that optimal linkages between 
community primary groups and bureaucratic organi- 
5 Kramer  (1969) has an excellent description of the problems of too 
much  closeness and too much  distance. Thus  he points out cases 
where too much  closeness has led to nepotism and corruption, as 
well as cases where the bureaucracy did not  serve the goals of  the 
poor that  it was presumably set up to do. 
Community Participation in Bureaucratic Organizations: 49 
Principles and Strategies 
zations are at some "middle point"--not so close as to 
cause structural friction and not so far as to cause lack 
of coordination. 
If this theory is correct, then the community seek- 
ing to influence the bureaucracy must make one of 
several diagnoses: (1) Is the bureaucracy too distant, 
too close, or at the optimum point of balance? (2) 
What aspect of the bureaucracy do they want to in- 
fluence-non-expert tasks or expert tasks? 
Principles  of C o m m u n i t y  Linkages  to 
Bureaucratic Organizat ions 
The analysis suggested by the balance theory permits 
the generation of more specific principles of community 
linkages to bureaucratic organizations. The first basic 
principle derives from the argument that primary 
groups and bureaucratic organizations have their own 
spheres of effectiveness. The principle states that if a 
community primary group seeks to change expert- 
technical tasks within a bureaucracy it must have a 
linkage procedure that provides the community with 
experts. If a community primary group seeks to change 
nontechnical tasks of the bureaucracy, it need only 
have primary group members as links to the bureau- 
cracy. Illustrative of a community using experts to link 
to the school would be where the community hired a 
lawyer to sue the schools. All linkages that have experts 
in them are called linkages with "bureaucratic inten- 
sity." Iaustrative of the use of primary group members 
as linkages to the school would be marches, boycotts, 
and direct parental talks with teachers. Linkages that 
consist of primary group community members are 
called linkages with "primary group intensity." Thus 
the first principle can now be restated as follows: When 
community primary groups seek to influence bureau- 
cracies on technical matters, they should have linkages 
with bureaucratic intensity; when they seek to change 
non-expert matters within the bureaucracy, they should 
have linkages with primary group intensity. 
The second principle of linkages rests on the need 
for the community to establish a balanced relationship 
in order to avoid the conflicts between their structures 
and the bureaucracy. The second principle states that 
when the bureaucracy and the community are very 
close, the community should use linkages that open up 
distance between it and the bureaucracy; when the 
community and the bureaucracy are too far, they should 
have linkages that bring them closer together. For in- 
stance, when the school and community are in very 
close agreement about the need to establish a Black 
curriculum then the community can delegate the task 
of writing a Black history test to the school's experts 
and keep very indirect contact. However, if the school 
is against the introduction of a Black curriculum and 
the community is for it, then the community must 
insure very close contact with the experts--usually 
hiring their own experts. 
If these two principles are simultaneously stated, 
then we have the four propositions indicated in Table 
1. First one should look at whether the target of change 
is in a technical or nontechnical area. Thus if we are 
dealing with a technical area and the community and 
school are too dose, one delegates the change to the 
experts in the school staff and exercises only indirect 
supervision (see No. 3, Table 1 ). If the problem is one 
of great distance, then one hires one's own experts and 
keeps close surveillance over the school staff (see No. 
4, Table 1). If the problem is a non-expert task and 
the school and community are too close, then one 
moves to a highly centralized contact through very few 
staff members, e.g., a centralized board of education 
(No. 1, Table 1). However, where the school and 
community are too far, one needs close supervision and 
moves to a procedure that provides closer face-to-face 
contact with many staff members, e.g., decentralized 
boards of education (No. 2, Table 1). 
These same principles hold whether the expert and 
non-expert tasks are closely intertwined or not. For in- 
stance, we suggested that classroom socialization and 
Table 1/Community Linkage Hypothesis 
Based on the Balance Theory 
Non-Expert Task: Expert Task: 












and school staff 
does not 
1.Highly Central- 





and Close Contact: 
e.g., decentralized 
board of education, 
local community 
veto power of 
teacher hiring 
3.Delegate Tasks 
to School Bureau- 
cracy: e.g., history 
teachers selected by 
staff to design text 
4.Community 
Uses its Own 
Experts: e.g., hires 
own historians or 
has power to name 
school staff who 
wfl! design text 
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discipline (non-expert tasks) are very interdependent 
with the exchange of technical knowledge, such as math 
or geography (expert task). We would argue that the 
community could handle the nonuniform aspects 
through varying degrees of contact with the staff. The 
most distance would be achieved by hiring a superin- 
tendent and trusting him to hire a principal and teacher 
who share common socializing and disciplinary values 
with the community. There would be less distance if 
the community insisted not only on hiring the superin- 
tendent, but also on having veto power over hiring the 
principal. These two, in turn, would hire the teachers 
who reflected the community's proper values. Finally, 
the least distance arises where the community members 
insist not only on all of the prior activity, but also 
upon a parent sitting in the classroom in order to insure 
that the teacher operates according to community 
norms. Our hypothesis would tell us that the first pro- 
cedure would be very appropriate where the community 
and staff were very close, while the latter procedure 
would be most appropriate if the community and staff 
were very distant or hostile to each other. 
Stages or Sequences ol Change 
The question arises about what else one must know in 
order to speak about the properties of linkages for 
closing and opening distance, as well as the capacities 
for dealing with expert and non-expert tasks. It has 
been pointed out that when bureaucracies seek to in- 
fluence primary groups there are at least two blocks 
that they must overcome to close distance with a hostile 
audience. First is what has been called "selective listen- 
ing" (Hyman & Sheatsley, 1947). People systematically 
refuse to even listen to messages that go counter to 
their beliefs. Thus, a Democratic candidate for gov- 
ernor might never reach Republican voters when he 
appears on television because Republican voters sys- 
tematically refuse to tune in on speeches from opposing 
candidates. A second block in communication arises 
where one manages to overcome the first block. In this 
instance the audience "selectively interprets" or for- 
gets that part of the message to which they are hostile so 
as to make it conform to prior beliefs (Hyman & 
Sheatsley, 1947). 
The above analysis suggests that there are at least 
two steps that must be undertaken if one is to deal with 
a hostile audience: (1) to get their attention, and (2) 
to insure they have absorbed the right message. Further- 
more, these two steps are independent of each other. It 
is possible to get the audience's attention without nec- 
essarily getting them to absorb the message. In addi- 
tion, it is possible that the technique for getting their 
attention might not be the same as the technique for 
change. 
To make this point very clear, let us consider the 
two techniques we have mentioned thus far as available 
to the community groups. They can use linkages with 
primary group intensity (primary group members) 
when dealing with non-expert tasks and linkages with 
bureaucratic intensity (professional advocates) when 
dealing with expert tasks. Getting the bureaucratic at- 
tention may or may not be an expert's task. Similarly, 
the task of changing the organization may or may not 
involve experts. As a consequence, there are four pos- 
sible sequences that might confront the community: 
(1) getting the attention of a bureaucracy is best 
handled by the community, but the problem of change 
involves experts; (2) getting the bureaucracy's atten- 
tion and getting change involves the community; (3) 
getting attention and change might involve experts; (4) 
getting the bureaucracy's attention might involve ex- 
perts, but getting change might involve the community. 
To illustrate, a community might utilize boycotts or 
strikes (primary group intensity) to get the school to 
set up a Black history course (which requires exper- 
tise). Or the community might institute a boycott or 
strike (primary group intensity) to get the school board 
to put local people in a position to make policy (non- 
expert primary group intensity). The community might 
hire a lawyer (expert) to sue the school system in 
order to get it to create a Black history course (in- 
volving experts) or the community might hire a lawyer 
(expert) to sue the school board in order to get it to 
put local people on the boards of education for making 
policy (primary group-non-expert). 
Thus, in our analysis, we want to consider both the 
process of getting the bureaucracy's attention and the 
process of change as two distinct steps that are analo- 
gous to the problem of selective listening and selective 
interpretation that occurs when the bureaucracy seeks 
to change the primary group. However, before pursuing 
this analogy too much further, we speculate on how, in 
fact, the bureaucracy selectively listens so as to avoid 
community messages that it does not like and, if it is 
forced to hear the message, how it selectively interprets 
so as to prevent changes it does not like. This analysis, 
in turn, gives us a much more precise idea of the types 
of linkages one must employ. 
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Getting the Bureaucracy's Attention-- 
Problem of Selective Perception 
Following our prior analysis we suggest that the prob- 
lem of getting the bureaucracy's attention might be 
either an expert or a non-expert task. First, we illus- 
trate the cases where the task involves experts and then 
the cases where it involves non-experts. One of the 
major reasons for selective listening lies in the fact that 
bureaucracies involve specialization and knowledge 
above and beyond that available to the ordinary in- 
dividual. As a consequence, the ordinary citizen does 
not have the knowledge to know which bureaucracy to 
go to or where to enter it. Therefore, his message is 
often never received by the right bureaucracy. A classic 
illustration of this point is the case of some New York 
tenants who found their water and heat turned off in 
midwinter (Purcell & Specht, 1967). There were five 
city agencies that dealt with water, i.e., one to turn 
it on, one to turn it off, one to handle faulty plumbing, 
one to keep it hot, one to handle water rates. 
If a tenant managed to find the right organization he 
was not necessarily sure where best to enter the organi- 
zation to get some results (e.g., who to speak to, 
whether to sue in court). If one understands that the 
ordinary citizen has a myriad of such organizations that 
he must deal with in his everyday life and that each has 
specialized rules and regulations, it becomes clear that 
in principle he would not have the kind of knowledge 
necessary to deal with his organizational environment. 
A second factor that leads to distortion of com- 
munity messages is that the bureaucrat assumes that 
anything offered by an "amateur" is suspect. He as- 
sumes that only bureaucracies deal with expert tasks 
and as a consequence experts are the only ones who 
can diagnose problems, etc. A third factor that often 
leads to distortion of messages is that any bureaucrat 
who is unsympathetic to the community can confuse 
the community by giving them wrong information. 
Thus, a principal in a school might tell parents that he 
cannot introduce a new curriculum because state law 
forbids it. He might not tell them that the law also has 
a clause that permits new curriculum in schools for 
experimental purposes. As a consequence, the com- 
munity's desires never get beyond the principal's office. 
Finally, it can be argued that the community's message 
never gets through to the bureaucracies because the 
community primary groups do not have the resources 
to wait until the message winds its way through bureau- 
cratic channels. Thus in the ease where the families 
were without water and heat in the winter, they needed 
a decision within a few days and the bureaucracy took 
much longer to even acknowledge the message. 
If the reader considers all of these reasons for mes- 
sage distortion, he will find that they all involve a 
lack of expertise on the part of the community. This 
situation leads us to one of our balance theory prin- 
ciples. In order to avoid selective listening on the part 
o[ the bureaucracy on issues that have to do with tech- 
nical matters, the community should have an expert 
advocate. Kahn, Grossman, Bandler, Clark, Galkin, 
and Greenwalt (1966) make this a central point in 
their advocation of local community information 
centers. It is the basic principle of the ombudsman 
concept as well. 
However, we would also suggest that sometimes 
communities can get bureaucratic attention without 
having to appeal to expert advocates. The optimal 
circumstance for doing so is where communication suc- 
cess can be evaluated by the non-expert and where the 
bureaucracy is highly dependent on or vulnerable to 
the primary group. Thus, in our illustration we sug- 
gested that the principal could fool the community 
because it lacked technical knowledge of the law. In 
such a case, the community could not properly assess 
the success of the communication. However, there are 
many instances where it is a simple matter to assess 
whether the communication has been received or not, 
e.g., whether the board of education puts on its 
agenda an item on Black curriculum. In addition, we 
think that bureaucracies have differential dependence 
on primary groups. Thus a retail merchant tends to be 
more vulnerable to primary group pressure than is a 
wholesale merchant; a political party right before an 
election is more vulnerable than right after; business 
concerns are more dependent on their workers than 
welfare agencies are on their clients, etc. We would 
argue that where the bureaucracy is vulnerable and the 
assessment of communication simple, the community 
can get bureaucratic attention by use of linkages with 
primary group intensity--strikes, boycotts, petitions, 
etc. 
Thus based on our balance theory approach w e  
would argue that the communities can overcome prob- 
lems of selective listening and get bureaucracies' at- 
tention if they use linkages with bureaucratic intensity 
for handling the expert problems, and linkages with 
primary group intensity for handling the non-expert 
problems. 
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Getting the Bureaucracy to Change-- 
Selective Interpretation 
We would make the same logical analysis for change 
as we would for insuring the bureaucracy's attentive- 
ness. Thus we would say that some change problems 
involve experts and some involve non-expert tasks and 
the community should use linkages that permit the use 
of experts and primary group members for each as 
necessary. To make this point clear, one can enumerate 
the number of ways in which organizations can change 
--personnel can be fired, new people hired, people can 
be retrained, rules or machinery can be changed, ad- 
ministrative styles of the organization can be changed. 
We would argue that all of these processes have both 
expert and non-expert aspects to them. Thus the as- 
sessment of a teacher might involve an assessment of 
his mathematical abilities (something only an expert 
mathematician can determine) as well as an assessment 
of whether he has basic values that are similar to the 
parents or not (something the parents can best deter- 
mine). Some people take the position that teachers 
have no expertise at all and as a consequence the par- 
ents can do the entire job of teaching (Rogers, 1969). 
There are teachers who feel that parents have no role 
in the change process of schools. We do not adopt either 
of these extreme positions. We think that the making 
up of curriculum does involve expertise (e.g., people 
who know history) and must take into account the 
community (e.g., to assess if the teacher shares com- 
mon values). If the primary group seeks to make up its 
own curriculum and to judge the technical expertise of 
the teacher, then the quality of education will drop. On 
the other hand, we think that the teachers who seek 
to make judgments as to what is good for the commu- 
nity and what the community values should be without 
consulting the community directly will also succeed in 
lowering the educational quality of the school. 
We would further suggest that the bureaucracy can 
resist the community on changes in areas of expertise 
in the same way they selectively screen out messages 
in technical areas--the community lacks enough in- 
formation to know what has to be changed, to know 
whether change has taken place or not, or to have the 
time for change to take place. Therefore we would 
suggest that to handle change in expert areas the com= 
munity must have expert advocates. Following the same 
logic we would argue that to have change in non-expert 
areas one could have direct intervention on the part of 
the community. 
Variable Social Distance, 
Selective Perception, and Change 
The analysis thus far speaks about the need to have the 
community use experts when dealing with technical 
tasks--be they ones of selective listening or selective 
interpretation. Similarly, when dealing with nontechni- 
cal tasks our analysis suggests that the community use 
linkages that contain primary group members. To this 
analysis we would now add our second principle--the 
primary groups and the bureaucracies should be kept 
at a balance point. Thus, if the task is to insure that the 
teacher has the proper values and the school and com- 
munity are quite friendly, then the community can use 
a linkage that minimizes the amount of face-to-face 
contact between community and teachers. The com- 
munity, through a large centralized board of education, 
hires a superintendent, who in turn hires everyone else. 
If there were bitter enmity between staff and commu- 
nity, the community would have to sit in the classroom 
to insure that its values were preserved. The hostility 
between staff and community insures that they will not 
engage in nepotism or favoritism. Between these two 
extremes would be the insistence on the community's 
part of giving local boards of education rather than cen- 
tral boards veto power over hiring the principal or the 
teachers. If the task were a technical one, then the com- 
munity could avoid contact with experts by having the 
bureaucracy handle its technical tasks. Where the 
bureaucracy and community are unfriendly, it is neces- 
sary for the community to hire its own experts to handle 
the technical problems. The fiercer the combat, the 
closer the community has to be with its own experts. 
We have tried to do two things in this section. First 
we have suggested the two principles of linkages based 
on the balance theory: (1) linkages can be directly 
handled by the primary groups where the task is non- 
expert, and by advocate experts when they are expert 
tasks, and (2) linkages must keep community and 
bureaucracy isolated when they are too close and bring 
them closer together when they are too far. In addition, 
it was pointed out that there are at least two stages to 
any influence process--getting the bureaucracies' at- 
tention and producing change. These can demand en- 
tirely different linkages from a community. 
A Classification of Linkage Mechanisms 
On the basis of the above discussion we are now in a 
position to suggest some of the fundamental properties 
of linkages that enable us to anticipate whether they will 
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permit the community to shrink social distance or main- 
tain it. The underlying dimensions that have emerged 
from the above discussion are bureaucratic intensity, 
primary group intensity, interdependence of expert and 
non-expert tasks, and, one we have yet to discuss, 
scope (i.e., the extent to which the linkage mechanism 
permits one to reach many people or few). If our esti- 
mate is correct, these fundamental dimensions can be 
used to evaluate any empirical linkages as well as sug- 
gesting new ones. To illustrate this point we take a 
series of ways in which communities have sought to 
influence bureaucracies and roughly rank them on the 
proposed underlying dimensions. The following are 
some of the ways the community has influenced 
bureaucracies in the past. 
1. Advocate bureaucracy. The primary group develops 
its own bureaucracy to deal with the target bureau- 
cracy. It can either develop its own as the union did 
to deal with management, or it can, through political 
processes, take over an ongoing one as political parties 
take over governmental agencies, or it can seize one 
through force as happens in revolutionary movements. 
2. Delegated bureaucracy. What characterizes this 
approach is that there is an already formed organization 
to which the community member can turn (e.g., a Race 
Relations Commission or an ombudsman). 
3. Voluntary association. Communities may have vol- 
untary associations rather than full-fledged bureaucra- 
cies represent them. Unions prior to their full-fledged 
bureaucratization were voluntary associations, the 
parents in Oceanhill-Brownsville had a voluntary as- 
sociation, etc. 
4. Mass media. Frequently the community can best 
reach the bureaucracy through mass media. This ap- 
proach is associated with public marches or riots, etc. 
5. Indigenous expert. These are persons hired by a 
bureaucracy and who live in the immediate neighbor- 
hood, e.g., teachers who live in their school district. 
6. Proto-indigenous expert. These are experts hired by 
the bureaucracy and who have backgrounds similar to 
the community, e.g., Black teachers in Black communi- 
ties, or who have special training to make them sensi- 
tive to the local community, but do not live in the 
immediate neighborhood. 
7. Low-powered indigenous non-expert. These are 
community members who act as street-crossing guards, 
lunchroom attendants, and as school and community 
aids in welfare agencies. 
8. High-powered indigenous non-expert. These are 
members of boards of education who set policy or who 
have veto power over the hiring and firing of person- 
nel. 
9. Systematic sustained boycott, strike, or violence. 
Illustrations are long-term union strikes, bus boycotts, 
and the French Resistance movement. Usually these 
mechanisms must be associated with a bureaucracy or 
a voluntary association. 
10. Ad hoc riot, strike, boycott. The big city "ghetto" 
riots, as well as spontaneous short-term boycotts or 
strikes by parents and students against schools. 
11. Mass march. The peace marches and civil rights 
marches on Washington, and the Black organizations 
marching in Pittsburgh to attract attention to their de- 
mands for more skilled jobs are illustrative. 
12. Single person ad hoc contact. The parent who 
comes in to complain about a teacher, or to get more 
information on a school program illustrates this mech- 
anism. 
It is clear that we have not exhausted all possible 
forms of linkage. It is also clear that the ones we have 
delineated can be combined in many different ways. 
In Table 2 we list the mechanisms and their rat- 
ings on each of the underlying dimensions. The column 
headings are the underlying dimensions while the row 
headings are the empirical linkages. These ratings are 
rough approximations that suggest the logic of our 
procedure. The actual ratings would have to rest on 
empirical research. 
With this in mind let us examine column one on 
bureaucratic intensity. Our ratings are based on the 
extent to which the linkage mechanism used by the 
community is itself a bureaucracy under the control of 
the community. Thus, the advocate bureaucracy has 
the highest ratings and is best represented in current 
American society by honest union bureaucracies and 
their membership. The linkages with the least bureau- 
cratic intensity would be the single person contact. 
In regard to the next column, labeled primary group 
intensity, the linkages in which community members 
are the major element, have the highest ratings. It is 
important to note that there are linkages such as the 
indigenous experts or proto-indigenous experts who 
are high on both primary group and bureaucratic in- 
tensity. Thus it is possible for one mechanism to be 
fairly high on both dimensions. It is also possible to 
think of degrees of primary group intensity. Thus a 
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Table 2/Hypothesized Rating of Some Linkage Mechanisms on 
Basic Underlying Dimensions of Linkages 
Interdependency 
Bureaucratic Primary Group o[ Expert and 
Variable Intensity Intensity Non-Expert Task Scope 
Advocate bureaucracy----community 
has its own bureaucracy--unions 
Delegated bureaucracy--community 
borrows ongoing bureaucracy--lawyers 
Voluntary association---community 
has its own voluntary association 
Mass media 
Indigenous expert--teacher who 
lives in the area 
Proto-indigenous expert--Black 
teachers for Black children but not 
living in neighborhood 
Low-powered indigenous non-expert-- 
school-crossing guard 
High-powered indigenous non-expert-- 
board of education with veto power 
over hiring and firing 
Organized boycott, strike 
Ad hoe boycott, strike---one-day 
affairs, short-term riots 
Mass marches---civil fights marches, 
peace marches 
Single person ad hoc contact--  
complaints or requests for information 
Highest Low Mod-Low High 
High Lowest Low-Mod Mod-High 
Mod Mod Mod Mod 
Mod-Low Low Low Highest 
High High Highest Lowest 
High Mod High-Mod Mod-High 
Low-Mod High Mod-Low Mod 
Low-Mod Mod-High Mod-High High 
Mod Mod-High Low-Mod High-Mod 
Low High Low Mod-High 
Low Mod-Low Low High-Mod 
Lowest High Low-Mod Low 
central city-wide board of education does represent 
community interests versus expert interests but the 
community it represents is a very large one and may 
lack the continuous contact and trust of a true primary 
group. 
In examining the third column on the ability of the 
linking mechanisms to deal with interdependent expert 
and non-expert tasks, we suggest that all situations 
where the expert is indigenous to the community or 
where he had similar values and background to the 
community are rated high. We also hypothesize that a 
local board of education with veto power over hiring 
and firing of teachers is also high on this dimension. 
Individual contacts by themselves are not linkages that 
enable one to deal with both non-expert and expert 
tasks simultaneously. Where the community group en- 
gages experts on its behalf (e.g., advocate bureaucra- 
cies) there is some ability to handle both tasks but the 
rating is not necessarily high (e.g., a lawyer can sue in 
court without having to emphasize non-expert tasks). 
The last column concerns the number of people that 
can be reached by a given mechanism. It is important 
to note that indigenous experts probably have the low- 
est scope in a society such as ours. The probability of 
finding indigenous experts progressively decreases the 
smaller the size of the community primary group and 
the lower the income of the neighborhood. By contrast 
it is more possible to find the proto-indigenous ex- 
perts. The community-wide policy board has a wide 
scope but the local board has lower scope. The single 
Community Participation in Bureaucratic OrganiTations: 55 
principles and Strategies 
person contact, in the same way as the indigenous ex- 
pert, has a very low scope. 
It can be seen how this classification of empirical 
linkages is highly suggestive as to when communities 
should utilize certain procedures. Thus we suggest that 
communities should resort to advocate bureaucracies 
or delegated bureaucracies when they are confronting 
massive resistance from their target bureaucracies and 
technical tasks are at issue. At the same time, it is 
clear that, where bureaucracies are highly vulnerable to 
primary groups, mechanisms utilizing simple primary 
group dimensions, such as a parent protesting or ad 
hoc boycotts or marches, can be very effective in chang- 
ing the bureaucracies. 
Some Generic Social Situations 
and Ideal Forms of Linkages 
With the above classification of linking mechanisms, we 
need only one more ingredient to pose a series of hy- 
potheses or policy recommendations for ideal forms of 
linkages. What we need is a sufficient description of 
the environment to say whether the bureaucracy and the 
community are at some distance or not, whether the 
task to be changed involves experts or non-experts, 
whether the two types of tasks are heavily interdepen- 
dent, which stage of the communication process we are 
in, and the structure of the target bureaucracy that the 
community seeks to influence. Ideally what one would 
like to do is to study all these factors simultaneously. 
However, for purposes of presentation we examine 
them three at a time. These initial discussions should 
permit a researcher, policy-maker, or community mem- 
ber to infer what types of linkages would be ideal for 
the more complex situations. 
Social Distance and Type of Task 
In our first analysis we simultaneously consider three 
factors--the social distance between the bureaucracy 
and the community, the type of task to be changed, and 
the sequencing of attention linkages and change link- 
ages. In Table 3 the headings of each column indicate 
the degree of distance (i.e., bureaucracies friendly or 
not friendly), the headings of each row indicate the 
type of task and degree of interdependence (i.e., expert 
task, non-expert task, interdependent expert and non- 
expert tasks). For purposes of presentation we have 
simplified and dichotomized very complex continuums. 
Within each cell we have indicated the sequence of 
mechanisms for getting attention and change. Putting 
all these variables together in this way reveals some re- 
lations that might not be obvious if each were considered 
separately. For instance, where the bureaucracies are 
friendly or vulnerable the community has only to use 
linkages with primary group intensity, even where ex- 
pert tasks need to be changed; the reasons being that 
where the bureaucracy is friendly or vulnerable the 
community primary groups can always borrow the 
bureaucracy's resources or experts to make changes. 
By contrast, where the target bureaucracy is hostile, the 
community always needs linkages with bureaucratic in- 
tensity (even for non-expert tasks) in order to get the 
attention of the target bureaucracy. With these thoughts 
in mind, let us briefly review some boxes in the table 
and see the kinds of predictions our theory suggests. 
Cell IV--Bureaucracy is not Friendly and the Task to 
be Changed Involves Expertise. This might be a situa- 
tion where the bureaucracy resists any efforts on the 
part of the Black community to decentralize the school, 
introduce new courses, or change their staffing policy. 
In such a situation, we hypothesize that, to get the 
attention of the bureaucracy, the community primary 
group has to develop bureaucratic power of its own 
through an advocate bureaucracy or a delegated bu- 
reaucracy. The development of union bureaucracies was 
in part necessitated by the recalcitrance of management 
bureaucracies that refused recognition and were able to 
utilize their resources to enforce it. On the school scene 
it may involve Black parents going to the NAACP to 
sue the school system or forming their own organiza- 
tions (e.g., OceanhiU-Brownsville) to produce a sus- 
tained and systematic boycott and going to churches for 
space to set up private classes so that their children 
will not lose by a systematic boycott. All of these 
procedures are designed to get the bureaucracy to pay 
attention. However, if the bureaucracy agreed to the 
changes, the community would insist on having its own 
experts draw up decentralization plans, write new texts 
for Black history, or insure that new procedures on 
staffing were being followed, since a hostile bureaucracy 
cannot be counted on for this kind of expertise. 
Cell V--Bureaucracy Is Not Friendly and the Task In- 
volves Non-Expertise. We again might have a bureau- 
cratic organization that is recalcitrant, but in this case 
the desired changes involve moving different commu- 
nity people into the bureaucracy. For instance, the com- 
munity might want to have new people and different 
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Table 3fldeal Community Linkages Under Varying Conditions of Social Distance and Types of Task 
Bureaucracy is Not Friendly or 
Type of Task Bureaucracy is Friendly or Vulnerable Vulnerable 
Task to be changed is technical involving 
expertise or large-scale resources, e.g., 
develop Black history curriculum; set up 
detailed decentralization plan; set up 
detailed desegregation plan. 
I. Primary group intensity to attract 
attention and that is all the community 
has to do. The bureaucracy provides the 
expertise for the change, e.g., ad hoc 
group of parents petition school for Black 
studies program and the school provides 
the money and staff to set up the 
program and train the teachers. 
IV. Bureaucratic intensity to attract 
attention and produce change, e.g., 
advocate or delegated bureaucracy 
threatens legal suit, systematic and 
prolonged disruption or  setting up 
competitive system to get the attention 
of the target bureaucracy as well as 
employing experts to set up the curriculum 
to evaluate teacher-training. 
Task to be changed is non-expert task, 
e.g., general racial policy on staffing; 
general curriculum policy on time to be 
spent on social studies, music, etc.; 
supervision of children crossing streets, 
or in the school during the lunch periods. 
II. Primary group intensity to attract 
attention and produce change, e.g., 
parents get together to elect new central 
board members who represent their values 
and change policy accordingly. They 
recommend more Black teachers to be 
hired, Black history should be part of the 
curriculum, etc. One can rely on staff to 
implement policy. 
V. Bureaucratic intensity to get attention 
and primary group intensity to get change, 
e.g., use advocate or  delegated bureau- 
cracy to organize systematic disruptions, 
institute suits in court to get attention 
of the bureaucracy to develop local boards 
of education that would ensure that 
parents' values are to be carried out in 
each school building. 
Tasks to be changed are interdependent, 
e.g., assessing classroom disciplining 
behavior, classroom racial attitudes, etc. 
HI. Linkages with primary group intensity 
and some interdependence, e.g., parents 
have power to veto hiring and firing of 
superintendent and principal and leave it 
to their discretion to hire teachers. 
VI. Linkages with both primary group and 
bureaucratic intensity as well as linkages 
that permit great interdependence for 
attention and change, e.g., advocate 
bureaucracy with threats of systematic 
disruptions, suits, etc., together with the 
demand that parents sit in on classroom 
sessions, have veto power over hiring and 
firing of teachers, as well as all other 
school staff, and the use of advocate 
bureaucratic sources to draw up decen- 
tralization plans. 
policies in the board of education. However, now they 
confront a determined opposition in the bureaucracy. 
This bureaucracy might be willing to put its profession- 
al resources into any battle for the board of education. 
In this case, for the community to win, it must have 
similar resources to hire newspaper space, to get out 
its constituency, etc. However, once in power they need 
a linkage with primary group emphasis to ensure that 
their policy is implemented. If the bureaucracy is really 
against the policy, then the primary group linkages must 
permit no delegation of authority to bureaucrats. For 
instance, if the board of education decides that it wants 
to experiment with decentralized systems and the 
teachers are against it, then the board has also to de- 
centralize its activities (e.g., local board of education) 
in order to supervise the teachers. This is true because 
general policies have so many contingencies that a 
single central board could not begin to police them. 
From a theoretical point of view, the student of com- 
plex organization might note that this solution to policy 
is different from Weber's, which suggested that policy 
be made only at the top of the organization, as well as 
different from the human relations approach that sug- 
gests that the bureaucrat internalize the policy (Blau, 
1955). It provides a theoretical rationale for the con- 
cept of participant democracy in a large-scale bureau- 
cratic organization without having to imply that 
differences between experts and non-experts are trivial. 
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The latter is often the rationale behind people arguing 
for such localized decision-making. 
Elaborations of Social Distance and 
the Use o[ Delegation and Scope-Secrecy 
The concept of social distance can be elaborated and 
approached from a slightly different angle to highlight 
one of the implicit hypotheses in Table 3. In thinking 
of social distance, we suggest that the bureaucracy can 
be hostile to the local primary group or the larger com- 
munity can be hostile to it or any combination of the 
two can occur. This elaboration of the situation per- 
mits one to highlight the role of scope in linkage mech- 
anisms. Thus, where the larger community is in 
sympathy with the smaller community and the target 
bureaucracy is resistant, it is to the obvious advantage 
of the smaller community to concentrate on linkages 
that stress high scope. On the other hand, where the 
smaller community is facing a larger community that 
is hostile but has a target bureaucracy that is friendly, 
the smaller community must stress linkages that have 
low scope, i.e., reach only the members of the bureau- 
cracy rather than the larger public. Thus, the smaller 
community might develop a volunteer organization that 
school staff can join as citizens and provide expert in- 
formation. Or the school staff might surreptitiously 
leak information to the voluntary association. This 
might be the case where the larger community is for 
public aid to parochial schools while the public school 
staff and the smaller community oppose it. 
Perhaps the situation that might trigger off the 
most secrecy is the one where both bureaucracy and 
the larger community are against the local community. 
Under these conditions the local community is likely 
to get squashed if it seeks change unless it initially 
operates very secretly (low scope) to build some or- 
ganizational apparatus--usually a voluntary associa- 
tion and then a full-blown bureaucracy. Once the 
smaller community has developed its bureaucratic 
resources the situation is quite likely to lead to violence. 
Initially the violence is more like guerrilla warfare, but 
this can readily escalate into a pitched battle between 
two or more bureaucracies that might approach a more 
specialized military pattern. Thus, the UAW in seek- 
ing to organize the Ford Motor Company in the early 
1940's was up against a trained private army and it 
developed specialized "flying squads" to deal with them 
(Bernstein, 1970). The sequence of linkages we have 
mentioned is typical of the development of trade unions 
in American society. It also can be seen emerging in 
the Black militant movement. To conclude these re- 
marks on social distance, we point out that the greater 
the detail with which we can define the outer environ- 
ment, the more we appreciate the theoretical impor- 
tance of scope as a dimension of linkages. In this regard 
we must also note that people and organizations may 
not be free to alter their shapes at will. They might in 
turn be instruments of larger social change processes, 
e.g., class conflicts, technological innovation. 
Organizational Structure 
and Community Linkage Procedures 
Another characteristic that is often related to social 
situations is the structure of the target bureaucracy. To 
make this point clear, let us examine three different 
types of bureaucratic structures: the rationalistic, rules- 
oriented structure; the collegial-human relations-demo- 
cratic structure; and the laissez-faire structure. The 
first is the classical bureaucracy that we have described 
before. It has specialization and hierarchal authority 
for handling situations that cannot be specified ahead 
of time, rules and regulations for situations that can be 
specified ahead of time, administrative discretion with- 
in each specialty, but no role in policy-making, im- 
personal relations, etc. The collegial structure moves 
in the opposite direction, except it does not go as far as 
primary groups and very much retains merit as a basic 
criterion. Nevertheless, there is far less emphasis on 
specialization. Small family service agencies or psycho- 
therapeutic treatment homes, advanced graduate de- 
partments in first-rate universities, advanced research 
institutes, all tend to follow this model (Litwak & 
Meyer, 1965; Perrow, 1967). In terms of educational 
philosophy the first model is consistent with a drill or 
learning machine approach, while the second is con- 
sistent with a pupil-centered approach. In contrast to 
either of these situations, the laissez-faire mode/ is 
characterized by each individual doing his "own thing" 
with no common values or coordination. It is basically 
the collegial model without coordination, 
Each of these structures has characteristics that 
suggest differential approaches if the community is to 
influence them. The rationalistic bureaucracy requires 
the outer community to have linkages with expertise 
to insure its message has been heard. This requirement 
is because this type of bureaucracy has much more 
specialization and rules and as a consequence the com- 
munity can easily make a mistake as to the correct 
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entry point. In contrast, the collegial structure---be- 
cause everybody tends to do the same thing and because 
they tend to have face-to-face meetings of the staff--is 
easily reached by linkages with primary group intensity 
and low scope. Somewhat different in this respect is the 
laissez-faire system. Since each staff person does his 
"own thing" and there is little communication between 
each, it is necessary to have a linkage mechanism with 
high scope (i.e., one that will reach most members). 
Furthermore, it might be necessary to vary systemati- 
cally the degree of bureaucratic and primary group 
intensity, depending on each member's definition of his 
job---as being more in the direction of experts or non- 
experts. Thus, some teachers in a school will be using 
a pupil-centered approach, others a drill, and still others 
may be doing nothing. 
The problems of introducing change are also dif- 
ferent in each of the organizational structures. The 
rationalistic organization differentiates between policy 
and administrative decisions. In our scheme, the first 
is a non-expert task, while the second is an expert's 
task. This situation means that insofar as the com- 
munity participates within the boundaries of the bu- 
reaucracy it can use linkages that do not simultaneously 
require bureaucracy and primary group intensity or 
close contact between primary group members and 
experts. By contrast, in a human relations-collegial- 
democratic organization, policy and administrative 
decisions are merged. Each expert is assumed to have 
internalized the policy of the organization. For the 
community it means that expert tasks and non-expert 
tasks cannot be separated and as a consequence heavy 
use must be made of mechanisms that permit both 
dimensions simultaneously, (i.e., indigenous experts; 
experts with similar backgrounds; local policy boards, 
which have veto power over hiring, firing, and training 
of teachers). By contrast, in laissez-faire structures 
there is no way to know which linkages to use, since 
some teachers might operate as though administrative 
decisions and policy decisions are separate while others 
operate as though they are joined. 
There is yet one final consideration of organization- 
al structure. Up to now when we spoke of changes, we 
assumed that the administrative structures of the orga- 
nization would be the same, but some specific activities 
would be changed. However, if we now consider admin- 
istrative changes, it is hypothesized that where one is 
moving from a rationalistic to a human relations struc- 
ture, it becomes increasingly important to utilize 
community linkages that have primary group emphasis 
and wide scope, because central to the human relations 
structure is internalization of values on the part of all 
members of the bureaucracy. On the other hand, the 
move from a human relations to a rationalistic structure 
might emphasize more bureaucratic intensity since it 
no longer becomes central for the members of the 
bureaucracy to internalize community values. The task 
of policy-making is reserved for the community mem- 
bers. Table 4 summarizes this analysis. 
We have now designated several key dimensions of 
the situation that, together with our theory of differ- 
ential functions of primary groups and bureaucratic 
organizations, enables us to state more precisely which 
linkages can be used most effectively by the community 
to change bureaucratic organizations. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Let us briefly summarize the major points of our paper. 
First, we tried to make the point that the very structures 
of the bureaucracy and primary groups made them 
powerful within their respective spheres, i.e., expert 
tasks and non-expert tasks. Furthermore, these two 
types of tasks occur in most areas of life (e.g., govern- 
ment, health, business, military, police) and they can- 
not be isolated. At the same time, it was recognized 
that primary groups and bureaucracies have somewhat 
contradictory structures. From this analysis it was sug- 
gested that any time communities sought to change 
bureaucracies around expert tasks, they would have 
to have linkages that enabled them to have advocate 
experts. Where they sought to change bureaucracies in 
non-expert areas they could utilize their own primary 
group members. We then went on to point out that 
interdependence of expert and non-expert tasks varies 
considerably, inside as well as outside the boundaries 
of the bureaucracy. As a consequence it was important 
to evaluate linkages on the basis of their abilities to 
handle both primary group and technical expertise. 
Finally, it was pointed out that it was necessary to take 
into account the number of organizations or people a 
given mechanism could reach. With these underlying 
dimensions in mind, we took twelve empirical linkages 
and suggested how they could be rated. We then took 
several aspects of social situations and showed what 
kinds of linkages would be optimal to both. 
It is clear that our analysis is far from complete, 
for we are in a frontier area of sociological inquiry. 
Prior sociologists gave little thought to theories of link- 
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Table 4/OrganiTational Structure and Community Linkage Mechanism 
Structure Community Initiative Organizational Change Administrative Change 
1.Rationalistic: specialization 
rules, impersonal, separation of 
policy and administration. 
2.Collegial-human relations- 
democratic: move toward 
generalist, internalized poli- 
cies, and committee meetings 
rather than rules. 
3.Laissez-faire: each person 
does his own thing. There is 
no central coordination. 
Linkages with experts who 
know which part of the organi- 
zation to approach. Need to 
have a person who is familiar 
with the system, e.g., ex- 
employee who now works for 
community. 
Linkages with low scope and 
with primary group intensity. 
All people in organization do 
the same thing and meet with 
each other so community per- 
son has only to reach one to 
ensure message will be heard. 
No detailed knowledge 
necessary. 
Linkages with high scope are 
necessary because the com- 
munity must reach most of the 
members of the bureaucracy 
to effect a change. For some 
the linkage ideally contains 
experts, for others non-experts, 
since they define their jobs 
differently. 
Linkages where expert and 
non-expert tasks are clearly 
differentiated, e.g., centralized 
policy boards that are isolated 
from the bulk of the staff. The 
bulk of changes require tech- 
nical expertise. 
Linkages that permit both ex- 
pert and non-expert tasks to be 
evaluated simultaneously since 
members of bureaucracy need 
to internalize organizational 
policy to carry on their jobs. 
Thus decentralized boards 
with veto power over hiring 
and firing would be necessary. 
No way to anticipate whether 
linkages with primary intensity 
or bureaucratic intensity are 
best since jobs are defined 
differently by each member of 
the organization. Community 
must be prepared to utilize 
several different approaches 
simultaneously. 
The move from a rationalistic 
to human relations structure 
will require linkages that com- 
bine expert and non-expert 
tasks, e.g., communities in 
local neighborhoods play a 
role in training teachers, 
hiring, and firing. 
The move from a human rela- 
tions to a rationalistic structure 
will require linkages where 
expert and non-expert tasks 
can be separated. Move from 
local to central boards of 
education. 
The move from laissez-faire 
to rationalistic would require 
linkages that keep expert and 
non-expert tasks separate. The 
move from laissez-faire to 
human relations would re- 
quire linkages that permitted 
both tasks to be looked at 
simultaneously. 
ages because they either assumed that bureaucratic 
structures and primary groups could not exist side by 
side in any strong form (i.e., they must be in conflict) 
or thought that primary group tasks could be isolated 
from bureaucratic ones so that the only forms of link- 
ages one had to deal with were those that stressed 
isolation. It is quite clear that our formulation is far 
different in emphasis than either of the two prior theo- 
ries. It  provides a theoretical base for community par- 
ticipation in bureaucracies without denying that experts 
perform different tasks than community members. It 
stresses the need to develop a linkage theory between 
bureaucracy and community that goes beyond isolation 
and conflict. 
There are several major gaps in our presentation. 
The assumption thus far is that the bureaucracy is 
sitting complacently by, while the primary groups seek 
to change it. In a prior work an attempt was made to 
show how bureaucracies change primary groups (Lit- 
wak & Meyer, 1966).  The joint analysis of these two 
conceptual schemes must be undertaken in order to 
increase accuracy of prediction and policy formula- 
tion. Without going into details of other paths of in- 
quiry that must be undertaken, we hope that this paper 
has been sutficiently suggestive to start others making 
their own inquiries. 
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